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THE DECISION TO REJECT THE JUNE, 1997 NATIONAL
SETTLEMENT PROPOSAL AND PROCEED TO TRIALt
Hubert H. "Skip" Humphrey, IIItt
I appreciate the opportunity to be here today, and I want to
thank William Mitchell College of Law, and particularly Barbara
Colombo, for their efforts in organizing this symposium. I hope
this will be one of many opportunities for us to meet as we come to
grips with obviously the number one public health concern in the
nation and, frankly, the world. I appreciate the chance to briefly
review how we became involved in this effort.
One of the great things about this terrific symposium is that it
has given me an opportunity to look back at the really incredibly
intense experience that the tobacco case was. I would hope, also,
that as we review the legal side of this, we remember that the law-
suit-as intriguing, complex, historic, and (as a learning experi-
ence) as important as it is-is only a lawsuit. The goal here is to
change our ways for the better public health. The lawsuit is just
one of the key vehicles for achieving that ultimate goal.
One of the things that strikes me as I look back at this whole
business is that nothing came easy, although at times Mike Ciresi
and Roberta Walburn and their team at Robins, Kaplan, Miller &
Ciresi made it look easy. Getting the documents was not easy. Nei-
ther was getting access to the industry's witnesses or trying the case.
Certainly for me, three of the most memorable moments were
the crucial turning points, the decisions that determined our basic
legal and policy direction. Now, you can probably guess at least two
of these. One was, why and when do you start the case? Obviously,
the other one was the decision to settle the case. Ijust want to say a
t This essay is based on a speech Hubert H. Humphrey, III gave at William
Mitchell College of Law's Center for Health Law & Policy symposium titled, "To-
bacco Regulation: The Convergence of Law, Medicine & Public Health."
tt Attorney General, State of Minnesota from 1983 to 1998. Prior to his
election as attorney general in 1982, Mr. Humphrey served as a state senator for
ten years, practiced law privately for twelve years, and served as a deputy United
States Marshall in Washington, D.C. He graduated from the American University
and has aJ.D. from the University of Minnesota.
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few words about those two before I turn to the third, and in some
ways, most difficult decision. That was the decision to oppose the
so-called national settlement ofJune 20, 1997.1
It has been a little over four years since I and a few people in
this room sat around a conference table, in the capitol at the office
of the Attorney General, debating the pros and cons of suing the
tobacco industry. At the time, the cons were a lot more obvious
than the pros. Think of it for a moment. We were talking about
taking on one of the richest industries in the country and certainly
the most politically connected. The industry had the reputation of
being invincible in court.2 We had a top-notch legal team, but we
knew that if we could field dozens of lawyers, they could counter
with dozens of law firms. In short, the decision to sue appeared
long on risk and short on reward. State attorneys general like to
say that they stand at the crossroads of law and public policy. Well,
I can tell you it was not hard to imagine that if we took on the to-
bacco industry there was bound to be some road kill. We hoped it
was not going to be us.
There was only one factor clearly on the "pro" side. If we did
pull this off, we would unmask an industry that had made an art
form of misleading the public and had legitimized the practice of
profiting from other people's misery. If we could rip off the mask
of legitimacy, we could save a lot of people. That alone made it
worth the risk.
Then a little over four months ago there was the decision to
3settle. Our case had gone extremely well, but we were in un-
charted waters going to the jury. I can recall Mr. Ciresi's eyes as we
came in on that last day and those last moments. The industry was
ready to concede unprecedented public health protections and in-
dustry reforms, not to mention putting some money on the table.
It was tempting to hold out for a powerful verdict that would have
1. See David Phelps & Maura Lerner, Don't Be Bamboozled, Says Humphrey,
STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), June 21, 1997, at 1A (discussing Humphrey's
criticisms to national tobacco settlement).
2. See Benjamin Weiser, Tobacco Trials; Cigarette Makers Once Were So Hard to
Beat in Court that Many Top Lawyers Refused to Take Them On. Then a Group of Attor-
neys, Mostly in Small Southern Towns, Found New Ways Past Tobacco's Defenses, WASH.
POST, Dec. 8, 1996, at W15. "For nearly half a century, despite hundreds of thou-
sands of American deaths each year due to smoking, the tobacco industry has
been nearly invulnerable in the U.S. courts." Id.
3. See The Settlement; A Sweeping Victory for Public Health, STAR TRIB. (Minnea-
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been the first courtroom repudiation of this outlaw industry. In
the end, the responsible course of action was clear. We found
through the settlement that we could meet and even exceed all of
our goals for the litigation. And we could find certainty in that set-
tlement. So we settled.
The third turning point, of course, came in mid-1997. In April
1997, I got a call from one of my state attorneys general colleagues.
She told me that she and a few others had been secretly meeting
with the tobacco industry for a couple of weeks about a global set-
tlement of all of the tobacco cases. She wanted to know if I wanted
to come to Washington, D.C. and join the process.
Imagine the thoughts that ran through my mind when I got
this call. I can still hear the phone conversation. It was no secret to
anybody that Minnesota, of all the litigating states, had built the
strongest foundation for a tobacco trial. We were forcing what was
to become the largest production of documents in history. We had
world-class experts, and our legal theories were one hundred per-
cent intact. So the thought did cross my mind, "Wait a minute
here, you have been negotiating a settlement of my case, our case,
without even talking to us?" That was rather interesting.
Fortunately, we were prepared. In fact, we had already had a
couple of dry runs at evaluating national legislation and dry runs
involving many of the same cast of attorneys general. The first dry
run started with a mysterious phone call back in 1996 from my
counterpart in Mississippi, Attorney General Michael Moore, who
said, "I want to fly up to talk to you in your office tomorrow. Do
not tell anybody." I said, "Well, I will check and see what I can do.
I have to check with my chief deputy." "No, no, no, do not talk to
anybody," he said.
He had secretly negotiated a settlement with Liggett, the
smallest of the tobacco company defendants, and he wanted me to
join in. When we saw the terms, we said, "Thanks, but no thanks."
We felt the deal gave away too much for too little. Liggett got im-
munity without agreeing to cooperate fully with our cases against
the bigger companies. So, we said no. We held firm. A year later,
Liggett came around and agreed to turn over all of its documents
and cooperate with the states.5 I recall that settlement because I
4. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
5. See David Phelps, A Tobacco Company Settles; Cigarette-Maker Concedes: Smok-
ing is a Cause of Cancer, STARTRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Mar. 21, 1997, at IA (de-
scribing Liggett's settlement and its agreement to disclose "extremely damaging"
3
Humphrey: The Decision to Reject the June, 1997 National Settlement roposa
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1999
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
was the last person to sign that agreement and the final concessions
by Liggett did not occur until about five minutes before we finally
saw the documents.
The Liggett settlement started us thinking more concretely
about the role of our litigation in the formation of public policy.
While Mike and Roberta and the other Robins, Kaplan lawyers were
in the courtroom making the litigation work, my staff and I were
refining and building support for the principles that we felt should
drive tobacco policy. These principles were well in place when the
other shoe fell in August 1996. That's when Attorney General
Moore and his outside counsel, Dick Scruggs, first floated the idea
of a national deal .
It soon became clear that although people were calling this
7proposal a "settlement," it was really not a settlement. It was a
proposal for Congress to wipe out the state's cases legislatively,
whether the states liked it or not. Needless to say, we had major
problems with this approach. Among other things, it would have
given the tobacco companies complete immunity from most law-
suits. It would have drastically curtailed the Food and Drug Ad-
ministration's ("FDA") jurisdiction.' And, it would have had little
impact on the companies' bottom lines.
But, it had some surface credibility. Mr. Moore and Mr.
documents regarding the tobacco industry); see also Paul Caminiti, An Industry Per-
spective and the Unique Role of the Liggett Group, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 447 (1999).
6. See Weiser, supra note 2, at W15. Their proposal was known as the To-
bacco Claims Settlement Act of 1996. See id.
7. See id. The terms of the proposal provided that the tobacco industry
would pay approximately $160 million over a 20-year period "to partially reim-
burse state Medicaid costs and fund independent research and public education
programs on the dangers of smoking" while also disclosing its own tobacco re-
search. Id. It also allowed the Food and Drug Administration's proposals to curb
sales to minors to become law. See id. In return, the FDA would be prohibited
from regulating the industry, the industry would be immune from suits from
smokers or states for 20 years, and damages awarded from any pending suits would
be subject to a cap. See id. After this proposal was made, many voiced negative
opinions regarding its provisions. See Joseph A. Califano, Jr., Big Tobacco's Smoke
Screen, WASH. POST, June 23, 1997, at A19. "The president and Congress should
preserve the power of the Food and Drug Administration to regulate nicotine as a
drug now and at any time in the future, as science and sound public policy dic-
tate." Id.; see alsoJohn Mintz & Ceci Connolly, Wounding the Giant; Small-Town Blow
Exposed Cigarette Industry's Soft Spot, WASH. POST, Mar. 30, 1998, at Al (describing
Moore and Scruggs' response to criticisms of their proposal coming from the anti-
cigarette movement).
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Scruggs are very persuasive gentlemen. There was also the little
fact that Mr. Scruggs' brother-in-law is a fellow named Trent Lott.
You may have heard of him. He happens to be, of course, the Sen-
ate Majority Leader.' °
Throughout the fall of 1996 and early 1997, we called atten-
tion to the shortcomings of this approach and we floated stronger
alternatives, particularly amongst my colleagues. Eventually, the
Mississippi proposal sputtered and died. But at that point, while
some of my colleagues expressed interest in my ideas for a tougher
approach, none of them were signing up to help me lead the
charge in Washington.
Now, I guess it is fair to ask a question here. Why wouldn't
every attorney general want to get behind the toughest proposal
possible? Well, the answer is that not everybody was as confident in
their lawsuit as we were. You have to recall this was not a multi-state
case brought in one jurisdiction like Minnesota where other states
joined in. There were individual cases in individual states, some of
which have stronger laws and stronger case law. Some of which
have substantially weaker state law and substantially weaker case
law. So, there were any number of situations in which there might
be weaker situations than we found here in Minnesota.
I had the luxury of being able to advocate from a position of
strength because our team was doing a great job in the courtroom.
When you are talking about the impact of litigation on policy, there
is absolutely no doubt: just as good facts make good law, good cases
make good policy. So I was glad to be in the position of strength in
April, 1997 when I got a call, "Hey, Skip, come to Washington.
We've been negotiating with the tobacco companies, and we think
we can reach a national deal." It sounded like an echo from the
past.
I did go. But, when I saw where they were headed, I came
home and instead of climbing on that bandwagon, I decided that if
we could not turn it back on the right path, we had to try and stop
it. When their proposed deal was finally announced on June 20 last
year," I called it a sellout. I can tell you that everyone on the team
10. See id. When approached regarding the idea of a national tobacco settle-
ment, Mr. Lott reportedly told Mr. Scruggs "that while he would not become di-
rectly involved in the talks between the parties, if a satisfactory deal was reached,
[he] would be willing to help enact the legislation necessary to put it in place." Id.
11. See Mintz & Connolly, supra note 7, at Al (stating that on June 20, 1997, a
"historic settlement" was announced wherein the tobacco industry would pay
$368.5 billion upon ratification of the settlement by Congress and the president).
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here-Mr. Czajkowski, Mike Ciresi, and Roberta Walburn-shared
that view. There was not a weak knee in the group. We had stead-
fast support from the American Lung Association, from the Smoke-
Free Coalition, and many other public health advocates." I should
point out that in time a number of other states came to share our
views. But, I can distinctly remember that day. It was a pretty
lonely day when we said "no" to something that on the surface
looked like the slickest deal you have ever seen with lots and lots of
money hanging out there.
Now, why did we oppose this deal so strongly? Well, the June
20 deal was the direct descendent of the Mississippi proposal we
had rejected the year before. Our detailed analysis of the deal is
14included in the materials that you have, but here are some of the
main areas where we felt it fell short.
It would have seriously weakened the FDA's jurisdiction over
nicotine. 5 There were inadequate incentives to reduce youth
smoking. 16 There were limitations on the tobacco companies' li-
ability tantamount to complete immunity from suit. 7 These outlaw
companies would have enjoyed legal privileges afforded to no other
businesses in our country. The compensation was inadequate.
8
States would have received far less per capita than we eventually
achieved through our settlement. 9 The document disclosure pro-
visions were weak and uncertain. ° Finally, there was wide-ranging
and unnecessary preemption of state laws.
12. See Phelps & Lerner, supra note 1, at IA.
13. See id. (describing the American Lung Association's opposition to tobacco
settlement); Mississippi Attorney General Target of Anti-Smoking Card Barrage, BATON
ROUGE ADVOCATE, Nov. 27, 1997, 13B (describing Minnesota Smoke Free Coali-
tion's writing campaign against criticizers of Humphrey's opposition to national
tobacco settlement).
14. See Appendix, infra p. 406.
15. See A Look at the Terms of the Settlement, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul),
June 21, 1997, at 16A (providing a detailed listing of the provisions of the June 20,
1997, settlement proposal).
16. See id. (describing limitations on advertisements in magazines with signifi-
cant youth readership).
17. See id. (describing limitations on seeking punitive damages for any past
misconduct and banning class action suits).
18. See id. (stating that the tobacco companies would pay $360 billion over the
first 25 years and then $15 billion per year thereafter).
19. See id.
20. See id. (calling for the industry to "tell the truth" about the harms associ-
ated with tobacco use and to establish a public library for all its documents relating
to the health effects of tobacco, addiction, and marketing directed at minors).
21. See id. (providing for the termination of 40 state lawsuits).
[Vol. 25
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The reason all this is important, of course, is because we still
do not have a national tobacco policy. If and when Congress does
act, the result may not be pretty. This raises a key point about my
opposition to the June 20 deal. I believe that we are better off with
no federal tobacco legislation than with bad federal legislation. If
federal legislation has unnecessary preemptions or tobacco com-
pany immunity (and those are two very strong possibilities if Con-
gress gets involved), then we are better off without it. Why do I
think that? In part, because we have learned from our history.
Remember the last time that Congress acted? We ended up with a
labeling act that preempted the states and gave the tobacco com-
panies a strong contributory fault defense.
But I also believe in federalism and the boundless creativity of
states, counties, cities and towns. Think of what we have accom-
plished here in Minnesota alone. I believe in federalism because
the city of White Bear Lake, Minnesota was the first place on the
22planet to ban cigarette vending machines. I believe in federalism
because the Great American Smoke Out did not originate in Wash-
23ington, D.C. It originated in Monticello, Minnesota. I believe in
federalism because Congress did not pass the first Clean Indoor Air
24Act, Minnesota's legislature did. It was not the Department ofJus-
tice that brought the first antitrust and consumer protection
charges against the tobacco industry, it was the Minnesota Attorney
General's office. So, we need to make sure that before we surren-
der to Washington what can be done at the state level, we gain
something from national legislation. I believe there can be a
proper national, maybe even international, tobacco policy but we
have to be very, very careful that we actually achieve that.
Now, as much as I believe in Minnesota, it is not just our great
state. It is cities, counties and states all over the country that will
change our tobacco-oriented culture from the bottom up as long as
22. See James Walsh, White Bear Lake Leads the Charge in Cigarette Vending Ma-
chine Ban, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul),July 9, 1990, at IB (stating White Bear
Lake, Minnesota, was the first city in the country to ban cigarette vending ma-
chines).
23. See Dan Wascoe, Jr., Smokeout Got Off the Ground in Minnesota in '74, STAR
TRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Nov. 15, 1995, at 1E (stating that the Great American
Smoke Out originated in Monticello, Minnesota, where residents were encouraged
to lick lollipops instead of smoking).
24. See Walsh, supra note 22, at IB ("Minnesota is the home of the Clean In-
door Air Act of 1974, which prohibited smoking in public accommodations, such
as restaurants, except in designated areas."); see also MINN. STAT. §§ 144.411-.417
(1998) (the Minnesota Clean Indoor Air Act).
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Congress does not bar them from doing so. It is private litigants
who will, slowly and surely, using our evidence, hold the tobacco
industry accountable for its actions.
Now we are on to the next steps. Next week we launch what
we hope will be the catalyst for the world's most effective tobacco
control efforts. As many of you know, our settlement set aside $202
million-that is about three percent of the total settlement-for
21tobacco-control activities. One hundred two million dollars of
that is for smoking cessation and the rest is for research on youth
26smoking and anti-tobacco activities. In August, the court ap-
proved our proposal to create an independent, nonprofit organiza-
tion to administer these funds. This week we filed the articles of
incorporation of the Minnesota Partnership for Action Against To-
27bacco (MPAAT). I am honored that former Surgeon General Dr.
C. Everett Koop and former Director of the FDA Dr. David Kessler,
have agreed to serve as honorary co-chairs for MPAAT.21 Its mis-
sion will be to design the world's most effective strategies for reduc-
ing the human and economic consequences of tobacco use. I be-
lieve that its inaugural meeting next Tuesday afternoon at the state
capitol will be a landmark.
The tobacco wars are not over, not by a long shot. We started
with a public health problem. We used the courts to combat law
breaking, and in the process, we unearthed information that
helped spur a reexamination of national health policy. Now
MPAAT gives us the opportunity to return to the health problem
and become a model for the world in beating this epidemic.
25. See Humphrey Names Panel for Tobacco Funds, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis-St.
Paul), Sept. 29, 1998, at 2B.
26. See Melissa Levy, Nonprofit Group to Direct a Sliver of Tobacco Billions; $202
Million of the $6.1 Billion that the State Won Will Go Toward Antismoking Efforts, Re-
search, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul),July 8, 1998, at lB.
27. See Humphrey Names Panel for Tobacco Funds, supra note 25, at 2B (naming
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The battle may have subsided here in Minnesota from the le-
gal perspective, but it goes on in Washington, D.C. We must take
up the effort on the public health agenda and see that we accom-
plish as much there as we have on the legal side. That will be a
great challenge. I know we can accomplish it if we work together.
9
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STATE OF MINNESOTA
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL




This memorandum is a preliminary analysis of the issues raised
by the proposed tobacco "settlement." The focus here is on the le-
gal issues, but we have attempted to include major policy concerns
where appropriate. The first section concentrates on the civil li-
ability and disclosure issues, while the following sections analyze
the regulatory provisions and the payment obligations built into
the proposal.
I. CIVIL LIABILITY PROVISIONS
Although many of these provisions do not come up until Title
VIII of the June 20 proposal, clearly the primary consideration for
the tobacco industry is the protection they would receive from li-
ability, both from present lawsuits and from possible future claims.
A. Key Elements of the Proposal
1. Termination of Existing Lawsuits
Many existing lawsuits would simply be terminated, or, for all
practical purposes, dismissed with prejudice by act of Congress:
* [[Editor's Note: Both the text and the footnotes appear here as they did
in the original memorandum, thus they may not conform with The Bluebook: A Uni-
form System of Citation (Columbia L. Rev. et al. eds., 16th ed. 1996). Where helpful,
additional information has been included, and this information appears within
double brackets to distinguish it from information originally appearing in single
brackets. ]
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* All present attorney general actions, all similar government
actions (e.g., lawsuits brought by San Francisco and New York
City), and all parens patriae actions;
e All present private class action lawsuits, including the post-
Castano nicotine addiction cases.
The states and the private plaintiff classes, the groups who
were at the negotiating table, would receive favorable financial
treatment in the proposed legislation. Not faring as well in the
proposed legislation are two other groups of pending lawsuits, who
were not represented:
e Any third-party claims brought as class actions, whether
based on subrogation or not.
* All other present "addiction"/dependence claims, which
presumably includes individual claims using addiction evi-
dence to avoid assumption of risk defenses.
Those cases will be terminated, and the state statutes and
common law which permits them to proceed would be preempted,
but it is not clear if they will share substantially in the financial
package.
2. Restrictions on Remaining Present Lawsuits
The only existing lawsuits that would be permitted to continue
would be claims of individuals brought by person [[s]] claiming in-
jury or their heirs, not based on addiction or dependence;' third-
party (and similar) claims not based on subrogation pending as of
June 9, 1997; and third-party payor (and similar) claims based on• 2
subrogation, but only those involving individual claims, not aggre-
1. Presumably, this means that plaintiffs could not assert "addiction" or de-
pendence in their pleadings and proof, nor could they allege facts or introduce
evidence of "addiction" or dependence as a response to an industry argument that
the individual plaintiff assumed the risk. In effect, this would be a new federal ex-
clusionary rule, applied to any litigation involving tobacco and health.
2. This is, of course, a critical distinction for the tobacco industry. In subro-
gation cases, a "third party payor," typically an insurer who has paid a claim to an
insured, is "subrogated" to the claims that insured individual might have against
others for his injury or illness. For example, ifJoe gets lung cancer from smoking,
and Blue Cross pays his medical bills, Blue Cross might be able to assert a subroga-
11
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gates. [That is, a health insurer who paid the medical bills for an
individual could file a subrogation claim against a tobacco manu-
facturer for that person, but could not do so for two or more indi-
viduals at the same time.]
Even those few remaining lawsuits, however, will be subject to
serious restrictions:
* No punitive damages, ever, under any circumstances,
based on past conduct.
* No class actions, joinder, aggregations, consolidations, ex-
trapolations, or "other devices to resolve cases other than on
the basis of individual trials," without defendants' consent.
That means the courts would be unable to use many of the de-
vices besides class action settlements they have used to help resolve
"mass tort" cases, e.g. nonbinding mini-trials, using hypothetical
verdicts to induce settlements; judicial identification of "represen-
tative" plaintiffs that go to trial first, and set settlement or resolu-
tion pattern; statistical or sampling adjudication, where claimants
agree to accept "averages" based on series of sample trials; or "sci-
ence-only" trials to establish liability and general causation, often
with epidemiological evidence, to be followed by individual adjudi-
cations (currently in progress in the silicone breast implant litiga-
tion). All of those innovations would be barred. If state courts re-
fused to comply, the proposal calls for automatic removal to federal
court, a new expansion of the jurisdiction of the federal judiciary.
e All industry defenses are preserved, including cigarette la-
beling act preemption defenses. There are no industry con-
cessions on liability, causation, assumption of risk, or any
other issue. There is likewise no limit on the availability of
new preemption defenses based on greater FDA regulation.
* Any evidence of the development of "reduced risk" to-
tion claim against the tobacco manufacturer, but then must "stand in the shoes" of
Joe, which means that the tobacco company can argue, for example, that Joe as-
sumed the risk. Third-party payor claims not based on subrogation, however, but
instead based on fraud, antitrust violations, or intentional tortious conduct, like
BCBSM's current case, do not face those same hurdles in court, and therefore are
a much greater threat to the industry.
[Vol. 25
12
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 2 [1999], Art. 8
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol25/iss2/8
1999] DECISION TO REJECT JUNE, 1997 SETTLEMENT PROPOSAL 409
bacco product after the effective date is neither admissible
nor discoverable, another new exclusionary rule. [Note: The
new Restatement on Products Liability emphasizes evidence
of an ability to reduce risk not taken as the basis of liability.]
* All claims against wholesalers, distributors, retailers, adver-
tisers, attorneys, or anyone other than tobacco manufacturing
companies, their successors and assigns, future fraudulent
transferees, or "entities for suit designated to survive defunct
manufacturer [s]," such as liquidating trusts, are dismissed
and barred. The agreement specifically refers to "tobacco
manufacturing companies," so arguably the non-tobacco as-
sets of these companies are shielded from liability. All state
law, whether statutory or common law, creating those causes
of action would be preempted by the new federal statute.
* All claims against insurers (not brought by tobacco manu-
facturers) are barred. State law causes of action would be
preempted.
* All individual claims and all pre-June 9 third-party payor
claims not based on subrogation (e.g. Blue Cross-Blue Shield
of Minnesota's claim, some of the Taft-Hartley health and
welfare fund claims) are subject to a $1 million annual pay-
ment cap, "unless every other judgment/settlement can be
satisfied within the annual aggregate cap." For example, if
Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Minnesota were to get a $100 mil-
lion judgment against the manufacturers, it might wait 100
years for payment, or possibly longer, because of the "global"
liability cap.
* The industry would be covered by a global liability cap
ranging from $2 billion in year one to $5 billion in years nine
and later, adjusted by the Consumer Price Index (CPI) or 3%
annually, whichever is greater, and adjusted downward or
upward based on domestic sales volume (downward adjust-
ment to be reduced by 25% of any increase in overall industry
profits based on domestic tobacco sales). Individuals or third-
party payors who secure judgments will have to wait in line for
payment, if the cap amounts are reached in any particular
year.
13
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* All successful claims against any of five negotiating compa-
nies would be paid pursuant to a 'joint sharing agreement for
civil liability," to limit competitive impact. Any manufacturer
with a judgment or settlement to pay would obtain an 80
cents-on-the-dollar credit against other required annual pay-
ments, which effectively pools the liability industry-wide.
* The five "protocol" manufacturers would be protected
from joint and several liability based on non-protocol manu-
facturer liability, and would be entitled to severance from any
case involving non-protocol manufacturer. For example,
then, the surviving spouse of a Chesterfield and Winston
smoker could not proceed jointly against Liggett and RJR
Nabisco, but would have to proceed separately against each,
with each defendant free to try to shift the blame to the
other. Moreover, if Liggett were out of business or otherwise
judgment-proof, RJR could not be held responsible [[for]]
anything more than its share of liability, no matter what the
state law on joint and several liability might be.
3. Restrictions on Future Litigation
Unlike present state and private class action plaintiffs, future
claimants receive no financial benefit from the proposed settle-
3ment, but their rights are severely restricted. They are subject to
all of the restrictions listed above for the present lawsuits which
survive-no punitive damages for past conduct, no class actions or
"extrapolation," no claims against anyone except "tobacco manu-
facturing companies," no "addiction"/dependence claims, no evi-
dence of "reduced risk" products, no joint actions with non-
participating manufacturers, annual individual case caps, and an-
nual global liability caps. With the exception of the ban on puni-
tive damages, all of these restriction [s] extend to future claims, even
if they are based on future conduct of the industry. In addition, there are
other restrictions:
3. Some of the private class action lawsuits may include future claimants
within their proposed class definitions, and so the impact on future claims may be
uncertain. Likewise, most future claimants would likely assert fraud or damage
occurring prior to the date of the "settlement."
[Vol. 25
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* No future prosecution of attorney general, parens patriae,
or class actions, of any kind, ever, relating to tobacco and
health.
o No third-party payor (or similar) claims not based on sub-
rogation, of any kind, whether based on past, present, or fu-
ture conduct of the industry. For example, all of the health
and welfare cases filed in the last few weeks would be barred.4
o No aggregation of third-party subrogation cases. Any sub-
rogation cases must proceed based on one individual at a
time.
B. Analysis of Proposal
The civil justice system has four basic purposes: the disclosure
of product hazards and corporate misconduct, fair compensation
for victims, punishment, and deterrence from future misconduct.
If this proposal is enacted, none of those purposes will be served.
The full truth about what the tobacco industry knew and when they
knew it will stay under wraps, most victims (except those whose law-
yers negotiated the deal) will go uncompensated or face insur-
mountable hurdles to asserting their claims, the industry will es-
cape financial punishment for past misconduct, and what is likely
the only truly effective incentive for the industry to take greater ac-
count of the public health-the prospect of unlimited, unknowable
liability-will be lost, all of this in perpetuity. In addition, the pro-
posal makes considerable changes in the relationship between the
states and the federal government, and raises a number of signifi-
cant constitutional issues.
This analysis focuses on the following general subject areas:
-Background
-Settlement of present class actions
-Prospective prohibition of class actions and aggregation of
claims
-Bar on punitive damages
-Liability caps
4. The Presidential Commission appointed to allocate unused amounts un-
der the caps is permitted to consider applications for compensation from third-
party payors making nonsubrogation claims.
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To understand the problems with the proposed legislation, it
might be helpful to have a brief background on some of the devel-
opments in the law that have brought the tobacco industry to the
bargaining table and have shaped this "settlement."
First of all are the changes in state products liability law that
have tended to favor plaintiffs in the past twenty-five years: the ex-
pansion of strict liability (no proof of fault required), the recogni-
tion of new categories of compensable harms (e.g. compensation
for fear of future injury), the increase in the level of compensatory
damages, and the relaxation of standards for awarding punitive
damages.' Closely related to that is the greater willingness of the
courts to entertain claims brought by those suffering more indirect
damages, including government and private third-party payors of
health care costs.
Second has been the development of techniques for bringing
groups of similar cases together, i.e. the development of "mass tort"
litigation-asbestos, DES, Agent Orange, Dalkon Shield, Bendec-
tin, silicone breast implants, nuclear testing, repetitive strain disor-
ders, and so on. Before the 1980's, class action "mass tort" litiga-
tion was relatively rare. The Advisory Committee that drafted Fed.
R. Civ. P. 23 [the federal class action rule] declared in the Rule
Comments that a "'mass accident' is ordinarily not appropriate for
a class action" because of the presence of issues like causation and
affirmative defenses like assumption of the risk that affect individ-
ual class members differently, and until the mid-1980's, the courts
largely adhered to that position. In 1986, however, the Fifth Circuit
affirmed class certification in an asbestos case, Jenkins v. Raymark
Industries, 782 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1986), and then courts around the
5. Although there has been some judicial and legislative retrenchment of
this trend, on other fronts, the trend continues. For example, the Restatement of
Torts § 402A, which imposes liability on the manufacturers of "unreasonably dan-
gerous" products used to contain comment i, which said that it only applied to arti-
cles "dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the or-
dinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the
community as to its characteristics," with the primary example being tobacco. The
current committee working on the third version of the Restatement has, however,
now voted to delete the "tobacco exception," and that could be expected to have
its influence on the courts.
[Vol. 25
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country began to reverse themselves-in the Agent Orange cases,
In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145 (2d 1987), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 1004 (1988), and then in the Dalkon Shield cases,
In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
959 (1989).r What changed the courts' minds on the mass tort
class action was the sheer volume of cases filed, and the perceived
need to aggregate the claims somehow to achieve some measure of
"rough justice" for the claimants.
Out of that has come a predictable mass tort evolutionary cy-
cle. In the early cases, defendants have the strategic, financial, and
information advantage, and tend to win. As information comes
out, however, the balance often begins to shift decisively to the
plaintiffs.
At that point, particular "mass torts," e.g. asbestos, become
recognized lawyer specializations, and the plaintiffs' attorneys who
have invested time and money in becoming experts become highly
motivated to search nationwide for new claimants to represent.
The cases become highly interconnected, and a success in one case
on, for example, causation, or avoiding assumption of the risk, af-
fects similar cases across the country, and increases their settlement
value. At that point, the number of claimants willing to sue can be-
gin to increase exponentially. For example, "worst case" scenarios
for the number of asbestos claimants were around 100,000 in the
early 1980's, but had increased to 500,000 or 600,000 by the early
1990's. The defendant manufacturers turn to mass tort defense
specialists and try to coordinate their efforts, e.g. the Center for
Claims Resolution (CCR), the 21 nonbankrupt asbestos manufac-
turers with single counsel, to match the coordinated plaintiffs' bar.
Once the courts see an avalanche of cases coming, the cases are
consolidated, the responsible judges become "managerial," and
they begin to explore aggregate techniques for getting at least the
common issues of liability and causation (and sometimes punitive
damages) resolved on a class basis.
Third has been the growing availability of statutory causes of
6. Some have suggested that the U.S. Supreme Court's recent decision in
Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor [Georgine], 65 U.S.L.W. 4635, 1997 WL 345149
[ [ 117 S. Ct. 2231]] (U.S., June 25, 1997) will significantly limit the availability of
the "mass tort" class action. To the contrary, what the Court did in Amchem is re-
ject "futures only" class settlements, where future claims are sacrificed for present
claims, and direct the courts to use subclasses to avoid single law firms represent-
ing different groups with directly conflicting interests. [[Amchem, 117 S. Ct. at
2250-52.]]
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action, enforceable either by state government or by "private attor-
neys general," for violations of antitrust and consumer fraud laws,
and the increasing possibility of recovering substantial penalties
and damages under those statutes. In Minnesota, for example, the
legislature has eliminated the "indirect purchaser" and "pass
through" defenses to antitrust,7 and has granted broad private
standing to enforce the unfair discrimination and competition, de-
ceptive trade practices, and false statement in advertising statutes.
Moreover, the Minnesota courts have very badly construed these
provisions to enhance consumer protection, expanding the con-
nection between conduct and injury necessary to permit suit, re-
jecting efforts to elevate the standard of proof, and ordering a wide
range of remedies, including restitution, disgorgement of unjustS 8
enrichment, multiple civil penalties, and attorney fees. See State v.
Alpine Air Products, Inc., 500 N.W.2d 788 (Minn. 1993); see also State
ex rel. Humphrey v. Philip Morris, Inc., 551 N.W.2d 490 (Minn. 1996)
(Court upholding availability of these theories and remedies to
both public and private plaintiffs in tobacco case).
Fourth has been the production of industry documents
through discovery that show an arguably unprecedented pattern of
unlawful conduct. In the Minnesota case, the industry has pro-
duced some 33 million pages of documents, held in storage deposi-
tories in Minneapolis and London, and in early May 1997, the
judge ruled that Minnesota had made a threshold showing that it
was entitled to see nearly 250,000 documents and over one million
pages under the exception to the attorney-client privilege applica-
ble when a crime or fraud may have been committed. Those
documents are currently under in camera review by a special mas-
ter, with rulings expected later this year.** As that information
comes forward, in Minnesota's litigation and then across the coun-
try, the informational advantage favoring the industry will have
shifted considerably.
All of these trends have done a great deal to shift the balance
7. 1984 Minn. Laws sec. 458, sec. 1 (response to Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois,
431 U.S. 720, 97 S. Ct. 2061 (1977)).
8. Minnesota authorizes $25,000 civil penalties per violation of the con-
sumer fraud laws, and $50,000 per violation of the antitrust laws, and the courts
have construed "violation" to allow for the multiplication of penalties for patterns
of illegal conduct.
** [ [Editor's Note: See Michael V. Ciresi et al., Decades of Deceit: Document Dis-
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of power from defendants to plaintiffs in these cases, at least in cer-
tain states. Unfortunately, some of these developments-particu-
larly the development of the mass tort settlement class action have
also created the circumstances for collusion-"repeat players," all
with an incentive to settle early;9 often a single forum with a judge
eager to get a "global" settlement; and passive future claimants
whose rights can be affected without their knowing it.10 As a result,
the courts have had to confront (and have sometimes embraced)
inventory settlements, where plaintiffs' counsel get present clients
and themselves favorable terms, in exchange for "global" settle-
ment of all future claims on terms favorable to defendants; double-
dipping, where plaintiffs' counsel get class attorney fees, plus later
fees for representing individuals in negotiated claims resolution
process; front-loading claim funds, so present claimants and fees
are taken care of early, at expense of future claimants, eligibility re-
strictions and illusory benefits."1
The ultimate result is the Georgine process: defendants facing
uncertain and potentially devastating liability contact certain plain-
tiffs' class counsel (who they have likely worked with before, and
who they know have a strong incentive to settle early) before law-
9. For plaintiffs' counsel, early settlement can mean early, and substantial,
fees with less investment of time and resources. For defendants, early settlement
can preclude tipping of the balance of power to plaintiffs, can avoid the perils of
bankruptcy, and can provide all of the spin-off benefits of greater certainty about
liability. For courts, early settlement is a way to clear the docket, and to avoid a
mind-numbing series of near-identical trials on the same subject.
10. Many commentators have written about this topic. E.g. [[John C.]] Cof-
fee, [Jlr.]], Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV.
1343 (1995). A letter signed by 129 law professors to the Judicial Conference's
Rules Committee, opposing Rule 23 amendments which would expressly sanction
settlement class actions, in a section called "Inviting Collusion," says that the rule
change would "license[] a regime under which plaintiffs' lawyers are encouraged
to compete to sell out the claims of people in order to gain the defendant's acqui-
escence to a. .. class." Their view was cited in Justice Ginsburg's opinion for the
Court in Amchem Products v. Windsor [Georgine], 65 U.S.L.W. 4635, 1997 WL 345149
[[117 S. Ct. 2231]] (U.S.,June 25, 1997).
11. Prof. Carrington has identified what he calls "significant wealth transfers"
inherent in settlement class actions - the shift in the burden of the transactions
costs of evaluating individual claims from the defendants to the claimants, the
transfer of wealth from those with stronger cases to those with weaker ones, and
the transfer of wealth to leading class action lawyers "who amass large fortunes in
short periods at the bar" from lawyers who would otherwise present the claims of
individual clients. See letter of Paul D. Carrington to Judicial Conference Rules
Committee, cited inAmchem, at _. [[117 S. Ct. at 2247.]]
12. Georgine is the asbestos settlement which the U.S. Supreme Court recently
rejected in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor. [[117 S. Ct. at 2252.]]
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suits are filed, reach "global" agreement favorable to current clients
but unfavorable to future claimants, and then file a complaint, mo-
tion for class certification, and settlement with a receptive court, all
on the same day.
With the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Georgine the last
week of this past Term, fewer federal courts will approve mass tort
settlement class actions, and no court could or would approve the
kind of settlement negotiated by the attorneys general and the pri-
vate class counsel-paying off present claimants in exchange for• 13
limiting the rights of future claimants. Hence, the issue goes to
Congress, which may have greater power to adjust the rights of dif-
ferent classes of individuals on this kind of macro level,14 but which
must also face the fundamental due process and equal protection
issues that were not directly addressed in Georgine.
2. Settlement of Present Class Actions
The proposal calls for all present class action lawsuits involving
tobacco and health to be "legislatively settled," without any further
discussion. At present, there are somewhere between 15 and 20
Castano-like class actions pending in state courts around the coun-
try, there is the Florida secondhand smoke lawsuit on behalf of a
class of flight attendants, where the trial is now underway, and
there are a number of third-party payor actions filed before the
June 9 cutoff which are proceeding on at least a purported class ba-
sis.
Although the public information about this is limited, the idea
of a legislatively imposed settlement of the present class actions
raises a number of obvious concerns and questions:
* How many people are included in the purported classes?
Do the post-Castano class action lawsuits include most or all of
the smokers that were in the original federal court class defi-
13. Indeed, Congress recognized this issue in 1994, when it adopted amend-
ments to the Bankruptcy Code to allow bankruptcy courts to consider and pre-
clude future tort claims against the bankrupt entity. Congress insisted that any
such resolution must meet two standards-future claimants must be treated in a
manner similar to present claimants, and there must be assurance that there are
funds available to pay their claims. 11 U.S.C. § 524(g), (h) (1994), as amended by
section 111, Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994.
14. Still open is the question of whether the federal courts can exercise juris-
diction over future claimants, who may not have standing sufficient to satisfy Arti-
cle III justiciability requirements.
[Vol. 25
20
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 2 [1999], Art. 8
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol25/iss2/8
1999] DECISION TO REJECT JUNE, 1997 SE7TLEMENT PROPOSAL 417
nition? Do they include potential future claimants as well as
present claimants? Will even the limited rights to sue suppos-
edly preserved in the "settlement" be extinguished or limited
further by these "side agreements"?
* Is it intended that this be a "no opt out" settlement for
class members (as in the Ahearn asbestos settlement negoti-
ated by many of these same lawyers) ?15 If class members can
opt out, are they governed by all other restrictions on future
claimants?
* Is it intended that the attorneys will negotiate some kind of
administrative compensation scheme for present claimants?
If so, how will different kinds of claims (e.g. serious lung can-
cer now vs. pre-cancer indicators vs. fear of cancer and so on)
be decided, and by whom? Will any new compensation sys-
tem be available to future claimants? If so, what assurances
are there that the fund will be adequate to pay those claims as
well?
* If future claims have been sacrificed to benefit present
claimants, do negotiators have a conflict of interest that raises
ethical concerns? Obviously, those losing otherwise viable
claims were not consulted by the negotiators.
* What are the proposed class attorney fee arrangements,
and are they appropriate?
We will not be able to provide answers to these questions until
we have more detail about these "side" agreements, but these are
good questions to at least start the inquiry.
3. Impact of Prohibition on Class Actions or Other Aggregation
of Claims
Under current rules, in order to proceed as a class action, sev-
eral criteria must be met: numerosity, commonality, typicality, and
adequate representation, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (a), and the court must
15. See In re Asbestos Litigation: Flanagan v. Ahearn, 90 F.3d 963, 986-87 (5th
Cir. 1996). The approval of that "futures only" class settlement is now highly ques-
tionable after Georgine.
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be able to find "that the questions of law or fact common to the
members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members, and that a class action is superior to other
available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the con-
troversy." Id. 23(b) (3). To make that determination, judges are to
consider: (1) the interests of members of the class in individually
controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (2) the
extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy al-
ready commenced by or against members of the class; (3) the de-
sirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the
claims in the particular forum; and (4) the difficulties likely to be
encountered in the management of a class action.
Therefore, what the proposal recommends is that, even for
cases where there are too many claimants to join them all, where
the questions of law or fact in common predominate over the indi-
vidual issues, where the representative claims are typical where the
representation is adequate, where the individual interest in control-
ling claims is limited, the litigation history suggests class treatment,
it is desirable to concentrate the cases in one forum, and the class
action is manageable, even under all those circumstances, the class
action device will be barred anyway, even if only used for particular
issues. Moreover, all of the other techniques for aggregating claims
will be barred as well.
On balance, the prohibition on class actions and claim aggre-
gation will likely have the following effects:
* It will discourage most potential victims from filing suit,
and few law firms will choose to make the financial and hu-
man capital investment necessary to become expert in bring-
ing these cases and going out and~getting an inventory of
plaintiffs. The costs of litigation against the tobacco industry
are high, the evidentiary burden is substantial (for example,
epidemiological evidence is much more likely to be admitted
in class or representative cases than in individual cases, even
though it can be highly probative on issues of causation),
and realistically, those costs can only be borne by lawyers
who might be able to share in class damages awards. Even a
plaintiff with $1 million in damages would have difficulty
getting an attorney, since few lawyers, under normal contin-
gency fee arrangements, could make such a case pay with the
kind of aggressive defense typical of the tobacco industry.
[Vol. 25
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9 If the history of other "mass tort" litigation is a guide, most
claimants do not come forward until the liability picture has
tipped decisively toward plaintiffs, which is much less likely if
class or consolidated litigation is precluded.
• Even, however, if the number of individual tobacco cases
remains high, and even if, with new evidence and successful
trial strategies, the balance shifts toward plaintiffs, and the
avalanche of cases the industry fears comes to pass, the pro-
hibition on class and aggregate procedures simply guaran-
tees that the courts would not be able to manage the
caseload except on defendants' terms, either by dismissing
cases, delaying their prosecution, or forcing settlements fa-
vorable to defendants. Consolidation in single forums, rep-
resentative cases, consolidated liability, causation, or punitive
trials, statistical sampling, "reversed bifurcation," and other
innovative techniques would be unavailable to the judiciary.
Therefore, even if the cases continue, the likelihood of fair
results is very low, and would only get worse as future claim-
ants come into the picture.
4. Bar on Punitive Damages
An absolute bar on punitive damages for past conduct, no mat-
ter how egregious the conduct, preempting all applicable state law
on the issue, would be an extraordinary decision on the part of
Congress. 6 Particularly with class and consolidated actions prohib-
ited, punitive damages attached to individual claims may be the
only way to attract attorneys to these cases, and the threat of puni-
tive damages certainly would be the only way the civil justice system
could still serve its deterrent purpose.
There is, of course, a case to be made against unlimited puni-
tive damages, particularly the prospect of repeated punitive awards
in a whole series of similar cases that end up killing rather than just
stinging the offending companies. Some judges have therefore
used class actions to resolve punitive damages claims together, and,
conceptually, a single or a series of aggregated punitive damages
16. In comparison, the products liability reform bill vetoed by the President
last year would have imposed a $250,000 punitive damages cap (or twice the eco-
nomic damages) in an individual case.
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awards against the tobacco industry could be justified.
Of course, such an award would actually have to punish the
industry, that is, be high enough to affect shareholder equity sig-
nificantly, and with restrictions to make it less likely that the puni-
tive liability could be laid off on either consumers, insurers, or tax-
payers. Clearly, the figures contained in the proposed settlement
and the requirement that those payments be passed through to
consumers through a per-pack charge do not meet those criteria,
on any level.
5. Liability Caps
With the restrictions on the kind of litigation the industry may
face, the liability caps may well be largely immaterial. Nevertheless,
there are concerns to be raised:
* Precedent: No other industry has a global liability cap, not
even those with per-case caps like the vaccine manufacturers.
If Congress is prepared to offer that to tobacco, they can ex-
pect other industries with liability concerns to seek similar or
better treatment.
* By definition, of course, all global liability or "case flow"
caps discourage and discriminate against future claimants in
favor of present ones, because of the prospect of payment de-
lay.
e With liability caps and industry liability pooling arrange-
ments in place, any adverse liability experience for any par-
ticular company is unlikely to have any competitive impact, so
the threat of competitive consequences for misconduct or set
of incentives is removed.
* The value to the industry of certainty about liability, even
at very high figures, would be difficult to underestimate: in-
creases in shareholder value, reallocation of management fo-
cus, removal of "fraudulent conveyance" barriers to tobacco
"spin-offs," greater or more secure access to long-term financ-
ing, and so on.
* If Congress were to remove the limits on class or consoli-
dated actions, or eliminate or modify the punitive damages
[Vol. 25
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bar, the $2-5 billion annual payments would likely be low. It
would initially be less than 2% of what CDC estimates the to-
tal annual harm to be, and could easily be consumed by only
a handful of judgments, e.g. the Florida flight attendants'
secondhand smoke case, or a single union health and welfare
fund case. Prior "mass tort" settlement funds have invariably
proven to be inadequately funded, and become insolvent
quickly once the liability picture shifts toward plaintiffs. If the
fund becomes insolvent, the possibility of successful constitu-
tional challenges to the abrogation of common-law rights be-
comes greater.
9 The payment levels contemplated by the proposal are, of
course, much less than what the industry can afford, particu-
larly with the appreciation in stock prices (20% during the
negotiations alone), continued growth in international sales
and the revenue-raising elements built right into the pro-
posal:
* Mandatory pass-through of costs to consumers through
price increases.
* Tax deductibility of all costs, whether punitive in nature
or not.
* Reduction in advertising expenses [current level: $6 bil-
lion annually].
* Reduction in legal expenses.
Several analyses have concluded that the industry could in-
crease prices by $2 a pack or more without sacrificing any signifi-
cant profitability from decreased demand. Such a figure would
generate at least $32 billion a year, again without affecting either
shareholder equity or industry profitability.
6. Disclosure
The proposal establishes a new centralized document deposi-
tory in Washington, D.C., which will contain the documents pro-
duced so far in the Minnesota litigation. 7 Those documents will be
available to Congress, state and federal agencies, and the public
17. Or in any other case, although the Minnesota discovery effort has been
the most comprehensive.
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under certain conditions.
The industry, however, would be permitted to withhold any
document for which it asserts attorney-client privilege, work prod-
uct, or trade secret protection.18 They would be permitted to con-
duct a new document-by-document review of everything previously
withheld on grounds of privilege (hundreds of thousands of docu-
ments, over 1 million pages), and then create new privilege logs for
that data.
At that undetermined future date, when the new industry re-
view is completed, anyone who wishes to challenge the industry's
continued assertion of privilege or trade secret must file a claim
with a new three-judge panel of Article III judges appointed by the
Judicial Conference. The decision will be binding on all state and
federal courts in all litigation in the United States, and may be re-
viewed only by a certiorari petition to the U.S. Supreme Court un-
der 28 U.S.C. § 1254. The only exception would be for disputes
that have already been "resolved" by other state or federal courts
prior to the time the three-judge panel has had the opportunity to
review privilege claims.'9
The panel will review claims of privilege or trade secret protec-
tion, not according to applicable state law, but rather under the
ABA/ALI Model Rules and/or federal common law with respect to
privilege, and the Uniform Trade Secrets Act with respect to trade
secrecy. The panel may appoint tobacco industry-funded special
masters, and, if the decision is to order disclosure, the panel can
consider awarding costs, fees, or other sanctions.
The likely result of these provisions is that the discovery proc-
ess nearing completion in Minnesota would be short-circuited, and
jurisdiction wrested from our state court system to the new three-
judge federal panel. Meanwhile, any surviving or prospective litiga-
tion would presumably have to continue while litigation in the new
federal forum over document production takes place. If one of the
central goals of the civil justice system is to force disclosure of
product hazards and industry misconduct, this proposal is a signifi-
cant step backward.
18. Compare the present situation in Minnesota, where the judge and a spe-
cial master are conducting an in camera review of those documents under the
"crime/fraud" exception to the attorney-client privilege.
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7. Constitutional Issues
Our research is still quite preliminary on these issues, and we
have reached no conclusions, but some of the major constitutional
questions presented by this proposal should be relatively obvious:
(a) Tenth Amendment [or more precisely, the Constitution's sys-
tem of "dual sovereignty"]: The source of authority for Congress to
take these actions would presumably be the Commerce Clause, and
obviously the authority of Congress to regulate commerce among
the states and, under the Supremacy Clause, to preempt conflicting
state laws, remains substantial. The Supreme Court has, however,
now made it clear that, despite that authority, the federal govern-
ment may not commandeer the states to accomplish federal pur-
poses. Printz v. United States, No. 95-1478 [[117 S. Ct. 2365, 2380]]
(U.S.,June 27, 1997) (Brady Act); New York v. United States, 505 U.S.
144 (1992) (Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments)
The proposal would have Congress directing the 50 state court sys-
tems to, in effect, change their rules of civil procedure and their
rules of evidence governing state-law claims. If state courts refuse
to comply, the consequence is that the federal courts take jurisdic-
tion through removal,20 although how these state law claims would,
absent diversity, become claims arising under the "laws of the
United States" under the well-pleaded complaint rule and there-
fore come within the federal courts' Article III, Section 2 authority
is not completely clear.
State courts of course have to comply with federal law, but
Congress directing them how and under what circumstances to ad-
judicate state law cases might be a qualitatively different assertion
of federal power, and raise significant Tenth Amendment and con-
stitutional federalism concerns. Of course, even if the courts did
not strike the statute down, the proper scope of federal preemption
of state legislation, state court rules, and state causes of action, both
statutory and common-law, and the precedent of that policy deci-
sion, are certainly topics Congress should consider.
(b) Due process/equal protection: The proposal would substan-
tially restrict citizen access to the courts, and would eliminate or
20. We presume this is intended to fit this provision within the exception
contained in New York, allowing the federal government to order states to imple-
ment regulatory programs, if states can opt out and a federal agency steps in to
take the enforcement responsibility. [[See New York, 505 U.S. at 167-69.]]
27
Humphrey: The Decision to Reject the June, 1997 National Settlement Proposa
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1999
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
curtail a number of both pending and prospective state court
claims. In particular, at least two elements of the proposal raise
substantive due process concerns-the elimination of entire causes
of action and the granting of immunity without substitute avenues
of redress, and the possibility of claimants being bound by legisla-
tively imposed "settlements" without an effective opportunity to opt
out. Likewise, distinctions in the treatment of claimants based
solely on the time of filing (present vs. future) may raise equal pro-
tection issues, particularly when it involves quasi-fundamental
rights such as access to courts.
The Supreme Court has noted that "statutes limiting liability
are relatively commonplace and have consistently been enforced by
the courts," Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group,
438 U.S. 59, 88 n.32, 98 S. Ct. 2620, 2638 n.32 (1978), and that the
"Constitution does not forbid the creation of new rights, or the
abolition of old ones recognized by the common law, to obtain a
permissible legislative object." Id. (upholding nuclear industry li-
ability limits in Price-Anderson Act); see also Cipollone v. Liggett
Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 530-31, 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2625 (1992) (al-
lowing preemption of state failure-to-warn claims).
There are limits, however. The Court has expressed its hostil-
ity to the idea of Congress setting aside final judgments, on the
grounds that the "Constitution's separation of legislative and judi-
cial powers denies it the authority to do so." Plaut v. Spendthrift
Farm, Inc., [[514 U.S. 211, 240,]] 115 S. Ct. 1447, 1463 (1995)
Moreover, the Court has at least left open the question of whether
the due process clause requires some reasonably just substitute for
common law rights replaced by a new federal statute. Duke Power,
438 U.S. at 93, 98 S. Ct. 2640-41. As Justice White noted in a dis-
sent from a dismissal of an appeal in 1985, "[w]hether due process
requires a legislatively enacted compensation scheme to be a quid
pro quo for the common-law or state-law remedy it replaces, and if
so, how adequate it must be, thus appears to be an issue unresolved
by this Court, and one which is dividing the appellate and highest
courts of several States." Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 474 U.S.
892, 894-95, 106 S. Ct. 214, 216 (1985) (White, J. [ [, dissenting] ]);
see also Pruneyard Shopping Center. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 94, 100 S.
Ct. 2035, 2047 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring); Cipollone, 505 U.S.
at 541, 112 S. Ct. at 2630 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part, joined by Souter, J. and Kennedy, J.). De-
pending on the circumstances governing present and future claim-
[Vol. 25
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ants, that issue may be tested if this proposal is enacted into law.
(c) Right to a jury trial: The Seventh Amendment provides that
[i] n suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall ex-
ceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved."
This would apply only to actions in federal court, but again there is
the question of whether Congress can direct states to eliminate
their own right to ajury trial in state law cases. In the federal court
cases, the Supreme Court has held that Congress cannot take away
that right if the cause of action is legal and if it involves a matter of
"private right." Granfinanciera. S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 109 S.
Ct. 2782 (1989); see also Atlas Roofing Co. v. OSHRC, 430 U.S. 442, 97
S. Ct. 1261 (1977). Of course, the courts have been divided on
whether damages limitations violate the Seventh Amendment, and
particularly when the limits extend to compensatory and out-of-
pocket damages, some courts might be more likely to find an in-
fringement of the right to ajury trial. If the proposed private class
action "legislative settlements" include mandatory, "cram down,"
'no opt out" arrangements, that may also raise significant Seventh
Amendment issues.
(d) First Amendment: Obviously, the advertising and marketing
restrictions raise "commercial speech" issues. See generally 44 Liq-
uormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, [[517 U.S. 484,]] 116 S. Ct. 1495
(1996); Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n,
447 U.S. 557 (1980). The proponents of the "settlement" claim
that by incorporating the manufacturers' waiver of First Amend-
ment rights in consent decrees that they can insulate the new rules
from First Amendment review. Given the relatively relaxed nature
of First Amendment standing, however, and the number of differ-
ent, non-tobacco parties who have an interest in challenging con-
tent-based marketing restrictions, it seems likely that the First
Amendment issues will be resolved judicially, no matter how hard
the parties try to keep those questions away from the courts.
II. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION (FDA)
A. FDA Product Safety Standards
The FDA has asserted jurisdiction to regulate nicotine as a
"drug" and tobacco products as drug delivery "devices," and Judge
Osteen in North Carolina ruled that the courts should defer to that
judgment. Coyne Beahm, Inc, v. FDA, Civ. No. 95CV00591, [[966 F.
Supp. 1374]] (M.D.N.C. 1997), [ [rev'd sub nom. Brown & Williamson
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Tobacco Corp. v. FDA, 153 F.3d 155 (4th Cir. 1998), and petition for
cert. filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3484 (U.S. Jan. 19, 1999) (No. 98-1152)]].
Under the proposal, however, unlike any other "drug" or "device,"
the FDA would not have authority to ban, 21 U.S.C. § 360f, deem as
misbranded, U.S.C. § 352(j), or recall 21 U.S.C. § 360h(e), tobacco
products under current statutory health standards. Likewise, the
FDA would be able to promulgate performance standards to regu-
late the contents of the product, as they can with any drug, but only
subject to the following special restrictions:
e No elimination, and no non-"gradual" reduction of nico-
tine yields for no fewer than twelve years;
* No reduction in nicotine, and no elimination of "other
constituents or other harmful components" unless the FDA
can find the modification: (a) will result in a significant re-
duction of the health risks associated with such products to
consumers thereof [cf. current standard-to provide reason-
able assurance of safe and effective performance]; (b) is
technologically feasible; and (c) will not result in the creation
of a significant demand for contraband or other tobacco
products that do not meet the product safety standard.
e New procedural requirements: formal rulemaking under
APA ' (trial-type hearings, right to introduce direct and rebut-
tal evidence through oral testimony, right to cross-
examination, agency decision based on "substantial evidence"
developed at the hearing), burden of proof on the FDA for
all findings, cf 21 C.F.R. § 12.86, full judicial review under less
deferential standard (not "arbitrary and capricious" but "def-
erence to extent to which matter at issue is within Agency's
field of expertise"), and Congressional "regulatory reform"
review.
21. The proposal refers to the Administrative Procedures Act, presumably 5
U.S.C. §§ 556, 557, although the FDA has its own "Part 12" hearing process, 21
C.F.R. pt. 12, which is also quite formal but perhaps less so than the formal process
described in the APA. Under current law, however, the FDA uses notice-and-
comment rulemaking, 5 U.S.C. § 553, to promulgate performance standards,
which allows them to incorporate their expertise and what they have learned from
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* Other new requirements after 12 years, when the FDA
could eliminate nicotine or other harmful ingredients: same
new substantive standards, "preponderance of evidence" bur-
den, rather than "substantial evidence," manufacturer [ap-
parently, each and every single manufacturer] can select
rulemaking process, judicial review of original decision and
all subsequent petitions to amend, minimum two-year phase-
in [cf current one-year or earlier], and Congressional review.
These restrictions, of course, apply to no other "drug" or "de-
vice," and they impose a virtually impossible burden for the FDA to
overcome in both the substantive standards and the procedural re-
quirements. They are also directly contrary to the negotiators' pub-
licly stated goals and what the Koop-Kessler Commission recom-
mends: full and unfettered FDA authority to do whatever is
necessary under current statutory authority to solve the problems
of tobacco and the public health.
B. Marketing and Advertising Restrictions
The proposal incorporates existing FDA regulations, and adds
prohibitions on the use of human images and cartoon characters,
extends the advertising ban to stadia and ads directed outside from
retail locations, further restricts point of sale ads, bans movie and
TV product placement payments, and the direct or indirect "glam-
orization" of tobacco use in media appeals to minors.
The effectiveness and significance of advertising and market-
ing restrictions remain controversial, but the following additional
issues should be noted:
* The proposed regulations go beyond current FDA regula-
tion, but they do not necessarily expand the FDA's current
authority to regulate.
* No penalties are provided for violations-no civil penal-
ties, no actual damages, no attorney fees, no private enforce-
ment standing.
* Some of the restrictions may be illusory. For example, the
point-of-sale advertising restrictions would permit outlets such
as convenience stores to display ten 2' x 2' signs-40 square
feet of point-of-sale advertising messages.
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* The FDA would be prohibited except under "extraordinary
circumstances" to alter the restrictions for five years. With the
burden of proof on the agency, and the opportunity for litiga-
tion that presents, that might limit their ability to regulate, for
example, direct mail, which appears to be the tobacco indus-
try's next advertising frontier.
* The proposal would continue to permit brand logo adver-
tising on the package, with teens being particularly brand
sensitive.
* Finally, no matter what is included in consent decrees,
nonparties to the agreements cannot be bound by them, and
will be able to raise any applicable First Amendment argu-
ments.
C. Warnings, Labeling, and Packaging
The proposal provides new, rotating warning on cigarettes and
smokeless packages. The warnings would occupy 25% of the front
package panel [smaller on certain flip-top boxes]. The FDA would
be required to promulgate rules governing the testing, reporting
and disclosure of tobacco smoke constituents.
Again, as with advertising and marketing restrictions, the issue
of whether warning labels deter smoking is controversial. There
are other critical points, however:
* The preemption language in the Federal Cigarette Label-
ing and Advertising Act would not be repealed.
e The rulemaking proceeding provides another opportunity
to dispute, litigate, delay, and possibly dilute the proposed
standards.
* The new warnings may well strengthen the industry's as-
sumption of risk defense in individual cases, and may there-
fore benefit the industry more than consumers.
[Vol. 25
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D. Licensing of Retail Tobacco Product Sellers
The proposal would mandate minimum federal standards for
licensing, to be enforced by federal, state, and local authorities and
funded by the industry payments. Anyone selling tobacco products
directly to consumers would need a license, with penalties imposed
for violations.
The primary problem with this provision is preemption. The
penalty scheme would expressly preempt more stringent state and
local sanctions, such as the ones recently signed into law in Minne-
sota. Moreover, the substantive law here may not be adequate; ar-
guably, it is only a return to programs like Philip Morris's "retailer
sanctions" program, which was notably ineffective.
E. Non-Tobacco Ingredients
Under the proposal, manufacturers would disclose ingredient
information to the public "under regulations comparable to what
current federal law requires for food products." They would also
provide confidential lists of added ingredients, substances and
compounds to FDA, by quantity in each brand. Manufacturers
would have five years, for each ingredient, to provide a safety as-
sessment, consistent with new regulations to be promulgated. The
FDA then has ninety days to approve or disapprove; the failure to
disapprove constitutes approval. Not all ingredients would have to
be publicly disclosed under the food laws, and nondisclosable in-
formation would be kept confidential. Companies would be re-
quired to adopt procedures for the selection, testing, and use of in-
gredients.
Although this would give the FDA clearer statutory authority,
the proposal imposes significant obstacles, which would make effec-
tive regulation nearly impossible:
* Five years for the industry to analyze what they likely al-
ready know, and then ninety days for the FDA to digest and
review the mountain of documentation that would likely be
produced is unbalanced. A much shorter time frame should
be imposed on the industry, with FDA given the authority to
act without restriction as reliable information becomes avail-
able.
* There is ambiguity about whether the ingredient disclo-
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sure requirements refer to the components of tobacco, or the
components of tobacco smoke. Some non-tobacco ingredi-
ents are perfectly safe if eaten, but harmful if burned and in-
haled.
* There is a five-year preemption of state content disclosure
laws, such as those enacted in Massachusetts and Minnesota.
[The preemption language is in Title V.]
III. COMPLIANCE AND CORPORATE CULTURE
The proposal would require the industry to create annually re-
viewed compliance plans to identify ways to reduce youth consump-
tion, and provide incentives for the development of reduced risk
products, to protect whistleblowers as permitted by current federal
law, to promulgate corporate principles, designate compliance offi-
cers, and report to shareholders on progress, to inform lobbyists
about the new requirements and limit their activities except as ex-
pressly authorized by the manufacturers, and to subject individual
companies to fines and "scarlet letter" advertising for breach of
their obligations.
The substantive change in this section is the requirement that
the Tobacco Institute and the Council for Tobacco Research be
disbanded, a remedy that is consistent with antitrust practice in
similar cases. The regulations to prevent re-formation of these
groups may be inadequate, however:
* No requirement that records be turned over to receiver
(or FDA), who would in turn disclose evidence of miscon-
duct;
e No regulatory or public interest representation on any new
group's board; and
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